The Mavericks were defeated by the Celtics 1-4 in the playoffs, and now it’s time to consider how to reinforce the team based on its current foundation and launch another charge toward the pinnacle.

While championship-winning rosters can remain intact, underperforming teams often need a rebuild. The hardest position to be in is like the Mavericks’—finishing as runners-up. At the end of the season, teams like the Nuggets, Timberwolves, and Thunder have left positive impressions, but the Mavericks, having lost in the Finals, appear vulnerable. In reality, they sit just one step below the very top.

Before making upgrades, the team must first clarify the gains and losses of this season: Where did they succeed? Where did they fail? And how should they position themselves?

Only by maintaining an objective self-assessment—neither overinflating nor undervaluing their strengths—can the Mavericks rationally replace players and target reinforcements with precision.

Given the missteps in the Mavericks’ history, this time they must stay true to their philosophy: keep who deserves to stay, trade who needs to be traded, and fill gaps where necessary. Objectively speaking, does Dallas possess the absolute strength to guarantee a Finals appearance? Not necessarily. They achieved a dark horse effect through unique traits, but in reality, multiple Western Conference teams have the potential to reach the Finals.

I’ve pieced together a complete, closed loop: Timberwolves defeat Nuggets, Mavericks defeat Timberwolves, Celtics defeat Mavericks, and Nuggets defeat Celtics.

The Mavericks’ tactical shift in March produced special effects, highlighting their defensive and rebounding strengths—a key point of differentiation. In fact, everything in the world has its unique advantages; it’s not about being all-encompassing, but about having distinct features. It’s about possessing something others don’t—unique differentiators.

Thus, preserving the Mavericks’ differentiated edge is the foundation for summer reinforcements.

Historically, as a long-standing competitive team, the Mavericks once made the mistake of repeating the error of constantly changing pieces (like a bear breaking corn cobs, only to drop them one by one). Except for Dirk Nowitzki, core members rotated like a merry-go-round until they finally achieved success in 2011.

The Mavericks’ backcourt has historically featured stars who could handle the ball and score, such as Jason Kidd, Steve Nash, Michael Finley, Jerry Stackhouse, and Jason Terry. The only one who stayed until the championship was Terry, who had become a sixth man by then. After many twists and turns, the Mavericks re-acquired Kidd to complete their championship journey.

In theory, as long as Nowitzki was in his prime, the Mavericks were in a championship window. But from when he became an All-Star in 2002 to their title in 2011, it took a full decade. When they first reached the Finals in 2006, he was only 27—meaning the Mavericks wasted many opportunities. He won the championship just a week before his 33rd birthday.

By facing this history honestly, rather than just glorifying it with phrases like “hard work pays off,” the team can approach the current roster’s performance rationally.

To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Mavericks can view Luka Doncic as a playmaking version of Nowitzki and Dereck Lively as a younger Tyson Chandler. Leveraging Luka’s prime and Lively’s rookie contract period should be the team’s fundamental strategy for the next decade.

Leveraging Luka’s window means building around him, identifying complementary pieces that address his strengths and weaknesses—just as they did by acquiring Kyrie Irving. They can target free agents, explore trades for contracted players, and not forget that the best help might already be on the roster, still young and developing.

As for Irving, I believe he deeply enjoys the team culture and the environment provided by Mark Cuban. Even when his contract expires in two years, he’ll likely stay.

Lively’s next three years on a rookie contract are a super bonus. Few teams can have a Finals-experienced center with such distinct traits for just $5 to $7 million. Remember, the Mavericks once traded for Chandler, who earned $12.6 million—equivalent to $25 to $30 million today.

Lively’s bonus period, combined with Irving’s contract, gives the Mavericks a three-year window to chase a championship. Otherwise, they risk roster instability and a narrowing window. Acting on this foundation requires first identifying why the Mavericks lost in the Finals.

The biggest issue: beyond Luka and Irving, they lacked a third ball-handler. This player doesn’t have to be a point guard—they could be a shooting guard, small forward, or even a power forward. A “ball-handler” here means someone who poses a triple threat with the ball: driving, passing, or shooting (what we call “being able to process the ball”). For example, four of the Celtics’ starters can process the ball.

During the Finals, coach Kidd had no choice but to force P.J. Washington into this role, but it was far from ideal. Both the Nets (historically) and the current Suns have built rosters around this concept—prioritizing three primary ball-handlers—but the Nets didn’t stick with it (Clarence Claxton wasn’t developed yet), and the Suns lack a center like Lively.

With the Mavericks’ salary cap tightly constrained next season (current contracts total $173 million, exceeding both the cap and luxury tax line by nearly $2 million), their flexibility is limited. Paradoxically, this might help them focus on precise reinforcements instead of aimless moves.

This role was initially intended for Tim Hardaway Jr., but his defensive weaknesses clashed with the revamped Mavericks’ system, leading to his marginalization and eventual benching. In Game 3 of the Finals, Kidd’s attempt to revive Hardaway backfired disastrously.

Still, Hardaway has value: he has scoring ability (once a candidate for Sixth Man of the Year alongside Malik Monk and Naz Reid) and a $16 million expiring contract next season, making him tradable. If GM Harrison and Kidd stay committed to the current style, Hardaway must be moved.

For perimeter playmaking and scoring, consider the Bogdanovic brothers or even re-acquiring Dorian Finney-Smith. Free agent targets could include DeMar DeRozan, Bruce Brown, OG Anunoby, Gary Harris, Alex Caruso, or even a discounted Klay Thompson.

What about Paul George? A player of his caliber joining Luka and Kyrie would shift the team’s entire philosophy, but with multiple teams chasing him and the Clippers eager to retain him, it’s more of a fantasy.

With limited roster flexibility, the Mavericks must also develop Jaden Hardy’s potential. Kidd’s decision to gamble on Hardaway over Hardy in Game 3 was a clear mistake. Hardy’s driving ability, mid-range shooting, and 6’4” frame make him more versatile than Hardaway.

If the Mavericks can add a ball-handler and improve team three-point shooting (their attempts and makes ranked high before the Finals, but dropped significantly against Boston’s defense), they’ll remain title contenders next season. After all, the NBA champion has been changing annually lately.